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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-(3)(2)(h) U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended governing appeals transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue: Did the Trial Court Err in Issuing a Permanent Protective Order? 
Standard of review: The Court of Appeals will disturb an issuance of a Protective 
Order where there are not specific findings of facts supporting the issuance of a 
Protective Order. 
Appeal Preservation: Appellant raised this issue in his Motion and Memorandum 
for a New Trial (R. 137-142) and also in the Motion and Memorandum to Modify. (R. 
153-169.) 
Issue: Did the Trial Court Err in Denying the Motion for a New Trial? 
4 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals reviews the Trail Court's decision to 
deny the Motion for a New Trial under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Appeal Preservation: Appellant raised this issue in his Motion and Memorandum 
for a New Trial. (R. 137-142.) 
Issue: Did the Trial Court Err in Refusing to Set Aside Certain Provisions of 
the Protective Order? 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will disturb a Trial Court's ruling if 
there has been an error in regard to the law. 
Appeal Preservation: Appellant raised this issue in his Verified Motion 
and Memorandum to Modify. (R. 153-169.) 
Issue: Did the Trial Court Err in Using the Wrong Standard of Proof in the 
Hearing Held February 8, 2006? 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will disturb a Trial Court's ruling if 
there has been an error in regard to the law. 
Appeal Preservation: The Trial Court raised this issue in its ruling from the 
hearing held February 8, 2006. (R. 129.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
5 
U.C. 30-6-1: 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abuse" means intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting to cause a 
cohabitant physical harm or intentionally or knowingly placing a cohabitant in 
reasonable fear of imminent physical harm. 
U.C. 30-6-2: 
(1) Any cohabitant who has been subjected to abuse or domestic violence, or to 
whom there is a substantial likelihood of abuse or domestic violence, may seek an 
ex parte Protective Order or a Protective Order in accordance with this chapter, 
whether or not that person has left the residence or the premises in an effort to 
avoid further abuse. 
U.C. 30-6-4.2: 
(1) If it appears from a petition for an order for protection or a petition to modify 
an order for protection that domestic violence or abuse has occurred or a 
modification of an order for protection is required, a court may: (a) without notice, 
immediately issue an order for protection ex parte or modify an order for 
protection ex parte as it considers necessary to protect the petitioner and all parties 
named to be protected in the petition; or (b) upon notice, issue an order for 
protection or modify an order after a hearing, whether or not the respondent 
appears. 
(2) A court may grant the following relief without notice in an order for protection 
or a modification issued ex parte: (e) order possession and use of an automobile 
and other essential personal effects, and direct the appropriate law enforcement 
officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that 
the petitioner is safely restored to possession of the residence, automobile, and 
other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's 
removal of personal belongings. 
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(10) A court may modify or vacate an order of protection or any provisions in the 
order after notice and hearing, except that the criminal provisions of a Protective 
Order may not be vacated within two years of issuance unless the petitioner: (a) is 
personally served with notice of the hearing as provided in Rules 4 and 5, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the petitioner personally appears before the court 
and gives specific consent to the vacation of the criminal provisions of the 
Protective Order; or (b) submits a verified affidavit, stating agreement to the 
vacation of the criminal provisions of the Protective Order. 
(11) A Protective Order may be modified without a showing of substantial and 
material change in circumstances. 
U.C. 78-45c-204 
(1) A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is 
present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an 
emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the 
child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. 
(2) If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be 
enforced under this chapter, and if no child custody proceeding has been 
commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 
through 78-45c-203, a child custody determination made under this section 
remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having 
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203. If a child custody 
proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having 
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203, a child custody 
determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if: 
(a) it so provides; and 
(b) this state becomes the home state of the child. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 59: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to 
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all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following 
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: (1) Irregularity 
in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been 
induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question 
submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a 
result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the 
jurors. (3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. (4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. (5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. (6) Insufficiency of the evidence 
to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. (7) Error in law. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case: Respondent, Peter Iacavazzi, and Petitioner, Kristin Choi, 
were married and resided in Bozeman, Montana for three years and had one child born in 
the marriage, Tanner, age 27 months in February of 2006. The Petitioner moved to 
Summit County, Utah on about the 7th of November, 2005, and on the 14th of December, 
2005 obtained an Ex Parte Protective Order against the Respondent based upon 
allegations of an incident that occurred on the 12th of December, 2005. The Respondent 
denied the allegations of any domestic abuse or any threat to the Petitioner. Respondent 
believes that the Petitioner only sought the Protective Order to gain an advantage in the 
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pending divorce action that had been filed in the State of Montana wherein the parties 
were fighting for custody of the minor child. Respondent contests the issuance of the Ex 
Parte Protective Order and Permanent Protective Order. The Protective Orders both of 
which were denied except for vacating the civil portions of the Protective Order. 
Respondent filed his appeal. 
Course of Proceedings: The Petitioner filed a Petition for an Ex Parte Protective 
Order on the 13th of December, 2006 (R. 1-14), and an Ex Parte Protective Order was 
issued on the 14th of December, 2005. (R. 15-20.) Respondent filed a Verified Motion to 
Dismiss for want of jurisdiction on the 19th of December, 2005 (R. 24-31.) A hearing 
was held on the 23rd of December, 2005, and an Order entered. (R. 61-68.) A Verified 
Motion to Vacate the Ex Parte Protective Order was filed on the 26th of January, 2006 (R. 
85-102.) A hearing on the Protective Order was held on the 8th of February, 2006, and a 
Protective Order was issued by the Court. (R. 130-136.) Respondent filed a Motion for a 
New Trial or to Amend the Findings and Order and a Memorandum in support of the 
same on approximately the 16th of February, 2006. (R. 137-138, 139-142.) There was no 
response filed by the Petitioner to Respondent's Motion for a New Trial. A Verified 
Motion to Vacate the Protective Order was filed on April 26, 2006, along with a Notice 
of Lodging which contained two reports by the Summit County Attorney's Office dated 
April 14, 2006, and one dated April 21, 2006. (R. 151-152.) A Notice to Submit in 
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regard to the Motion for in court hearing and the Verified Motion to Vacate was filed 
approximately the 26th of April, 2006, (R. 173-174). The request for hearing on 
Respondent's Motion to Vacate the Protective Order and in court hearing and conference 
was filed on the 15th of May, 2006. (R. 175-176.) A hearing was held on the 5th of June, 
2006 wherein the Court dismissed the civil aspects of the Protective Order (R. 194.) On 
the 13th of June, 2006, the Respondent filed a Notice to Submit his Motion to Vacate the 
Protective Order for the reason that the Petitioner failed to respond to the motion. (R. 
197-198.) The Court failed to respond to the Notice to Submit. Respondent filed an 
additional Notice to Submit on the 30th of August, 2006 (R. 199-200) and a request to 
schedule a hearing. As of August 30, 2006, the Petitioner had failed to respond to either 
the Verified Motion to Vacate the Protective Order filed on the 26th of April, 2006 (R. 
153-169) or Motion for a New Trial. (R. 137.) The Court failed to respond to the 
additional Notice to Submit. On the 16th of January, 2007, a request for a hearing was 
filed (R. 201), and a hearing was held on the 21st of February, 2007 before Commissioner 
Michelle Tack on the Motion to Vacate and the Court denied the same. (R. 208.) An 
objection to the Commissioner's recommendation was filed on the 26th of February, 2007 
(R. 209-210). A second notice to submit for ruling was filed by Respondent on the 26 n 
of February, 2007 in regard to Respondent's Motion for a New Trial which was filed in 
February 2006. (R. 211-212) (Apparently the First Notice to Submit that Respondent 
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filed in March of 2006 for some unknown reason did not make its way into the file.) The 
Court entered its Ruling and Order denying Respondent's objection, denying the Motion 
for a New Trial, and denying a Request for an oral argument on the 28th of February 
2006. (R. 213-215.) Finally, after the Court had already entered its Ruling on 
Respondent's Motion without any response received from the Petitioner, the Petitioner 
filed a Memorandum and Opposition to the Motion for a New Trial on the 9th of March, 
2007. (R. 219- 225.) The Court signed an Order prepared by counsel for the Petitioner on 
the 16th of March, 2007, denying the additional Motion for a New Trial (R. 231-232), 
although there was no additional Motion for a New Trial and the Court had already ruled 
on Respondent's Motion for a New Trial filed in February 2006, in its Ruling and Order 
on the 28th of February, 2007. Respondent filed its Notice of Appeal on the 21st of 
March, 2007 (R. 233-234.) 
Disposition Below: The Trial Court granted the Protective Order and denied the 
Motion to Vacate, the Motion for a New Trial, and found that the Respondent's 
objections to the Commissioner's recommendation stated no basis that justifies relief. 
The Trial Court agreed with the Commissioner's ruling that the criminal portions of the 
Protective Order could not be modified without the consent of the Petitioner. The 
Respondent also requested in February 2006 that the Trial Court grant a new trial in this 
matter and the Trial Court indicated in its Ruling and Order that there was no basis to 
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grant a new trial and the Motion was denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. As of February 2006, the parties had been married for three years and one child 
was born in the marriage, Tanner, age 27 months in February 2006. (T. 22-23.) 
2. The Petitioner, Kristin Choi, moved to Summit County, Utah on about the 7th of 
November, 2005. (T. 25-26.) Since the minor child, Tanner's, birth and prior to the 
Petitioner moving to Utah in November of 2007, the parties lived in Respondent's three 
bedroom condo in Bozeman, Montana. The Respondent still resided there in February of 
2006. (T. 139-143.) 
3. An incident occurred some time in June 2006 in Bozeman, Montana wherein the 
Petitioner alleged that the Respondent at their home and residence pushed her out of the 
way, and in a violent and abrupt attack knocked her off her feet, approximately three 
times, although the Petitioner admitted that the Respondent did not hit her on that day (T. 
36.) However, on cross examination the Petitioner changed her testimony and stated that 
the Respondent only shoved her and pushed her out of the way. (T. 69.) Moreover, the 
Respondent stated in Exhibit 1 presented to the Court at the hearing on February 8, 2006, 
and (attached hereto an Addendum 1), "Let me reiterate with you as I did with 
responding officers, my husband, Peter, did not touch me. He in no way threatened me 
with physical violence and again he did not put his hands upon me." (T. 70.) 
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4. The Respondent was arrested from the incident in Bozeman, Montana in May of 
2005 based on statements made at the time by the Petitioner; however, she recanted her 
statements in the letter written to the District Attorney (Addendum 1) and the charges 
against the Respondent were reduced to disorderly conduct. (T. 135- 137.) 
5. Respondent denies every physically assaulting the Petitioner. (T. 133-135.) 
Further, the Respondent has never been arrested, except for the one incident in Bozeman, 
Montana in June of 2006 (T. 136.) 
6. The incident upon which the Ex Parte Order was issued in December 15, 2006 
occurred in Park City, Utah on approximately the 12th of December, 2006. The Petitioner 
alleged that she received a threatening voicemail from the Respondent (T. 45); however, 
the Petitioner did not present any voicemail evidence but only her recollection and stated 
that the voicemail said that the Respondent was coming to her work and coming to get 
her. The Petitioner also stated she was afraid that the Respondent would take the minor 
child, Tanner, on said date and therefore went to the daycare center where Tanner was. 
The Petitioner went to the daycare center to pick up the minor child rather than going 
straight to sheriff department or police to report the alleged threat. (T. 48.) The 
Petitioner's statement of what occurred at the daycare center (T. 49-50) varied 
considerably with the Respondent's version of what occurred at the daycare center. (T. 
147-150.) 
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7. The Petitioner's statement made to the Court on the Verified Petitioner for 
Protective Order (R. 1-14) as well as her testimony from the hearing on February 8, 2006, 
also differ from the two reports of the Summit County Attorney's Office (R. 150-151) 
also attached to the Notice of Lodging filed 26th of April, 2006 (R. 51-52.) 
8. Since February 2006, Petitioner, either personally or by and through Dinah 
Kennedy her mother who lives with Petitioner, contacted Dave Berry, Respondent's best 
friend, or Respondent directly with requests that he call Petitioner on her cell phone 
without repercussion. (R. 91-92, 153-169, and Exhibits.) Petitioner has directly and 
indirectly made numerous telephone contacts with Respondent, well over 100 times, 
since the February 8, 2006 hearing. (R. 91-92, 157-161, and Exhibits.) 
9. In March of 2006, the minor child was in Respondent's care and Petitioner was 
trying to locate Respondent. When she was unable to locate him, she contacted the 
Montana police and reported that Respondent kidnapped the minor child and left the state 
of Utah in violation of the Order. Dave Berry informed Petitioner that she should not be 
contacting Respondent and that the Order specifically restricts Respondent from 
communicating with Petitioner by phone. (R. 157-161 and Exhibits.) 
10. In April of 2006, Petitioner and Dinah Kennedy made a trip to Bozeman, Montana 
and invaded the parties' marital residence to take personal property there from, while 
Respondent was at home. Petitioner going to Montana, without Respondent's 
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knowledge, created a situation where Petitioner actually contacted Respondent to find out 
the whereabouts of the property. (R. 157-161 and Exhibits.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Respondent respectfully argues that the Trial Court failed to make specific 
findings and the Petitioner failed to establish either a history of abuse or threat of 
imminent harm; and therefore, the Protective Order should not have issued. 
Further, the Respondent respectfully argues that the Trial Court abused its 
discretion in failing to grant the Motion for a New Trial when it appeared that the Trial 
Court had made an error in law in regard to exercising jurisdiction over the custody and 
parenting time issue. Also, the Trial Court made an error in law in issuing the Protective 
Order without the Petitioner meeting her burden of proof 
The Respondent respectfully argues that the Trial Court erred in failing to set aside 
the provisions of the Protective Order when sufficient evidence was presented that the 
Petitioner consented to vacating of the Protective Order through her actions and there 
were false representations made by the Respondent to the Court to obtain the original 
Protective Order. 
Lastly, the Respondent respectfully argues that the Trial Court should have 
required the Petitioner to meet her burden by clear and convincing evidence and not just 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Did the Trial Court Err in Issuing a Permanent Protective Order? 
The Trial Court's decision to issue a permanent Protective Order was in error for 
the reason that the Petitioner failed to establish and present sufficient evidence to satisfy 
the requirements of Utah Code 30-6-2(1). According to said statute, in order for the 
Petitioner to obtain a Protective Order, she is required to show that she "has been 
subjected to abuse or domestic violence or that there was a substantial likelihood of 
immediate danger of abuse or domestic violence to her." The Court failed to make any 
specific findings in regard to any abuse, domestic violence, or imminent danger. The 
only findings in regard to the Court's decision from the hearing held on the 8th of 
February, 2006, are contained in the Court's oral ruling at said hearing. (T. 191-195.) 
In Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, Utah 2002, the Utah Supreme Court discuss the 
requirements of the Trial Court in making findings to establish grounds for a Protective 
Order under Utah Code 30-6-2(1). In the Bailey case, the Trial Court found that during 
the marriage that Bayles had physically abused Bailey by slapping her. The Trial Court 
also found that Bayles threatened Bailey during the marriage by holding a pistol to her 
neck and telling her he would kill her anytime he wanted. The Court found that this 
behavior satisfied the statutory definition of abuse and intentionally placed Bailey in fear 
of imminent physical harm. Id. 1165. However, in Bailey, the Trial Court made specific 
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findings in regard to a history of incident of physical abuse. In the present case, the 
Court made no such findings. There were allegations made by the Petitioner in regard to 
incidents of physical abuse which the Respondent adamantly denied. There was no 
evidence presented of any police reports or any prosecution, whatsoever, for any type of 
abuse other than the one incident that occurred in Bozeman, MT. 
This Court should not make the required specific findings for the Trial Court. 
"The Appellate Court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy and uniformity, and 
should defer to the Trial Court on factual matters/' Wiley v. Wiley, 951 P.2d 226, 230-231 
(Utah 1997). "It is inappropriate for an Appellate Court to disregard the Trial Court's 
findings of fact and to assume the role of weighing evidence and makings its own 
findings of fact." Id 230. (See also 5 CJS Appeal and Error, Section 710, 1993) "The 
Reviewing Court is confined to the facts specifically found by the Trial Court and the 
Reviewing Court may not make findings of facts for or against the Appellant." 
There are numerous cases decided by this Court in regard to inadequate findings 
by the Trial Court which justify a remand. (See Waltons v. Waltons, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah 
App. I99l\ Howell v Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991), Allredv Allred, 797 P.2d 
1109 (Utah App. 1990)). The Trial Court should make the specific findings. 
However, oral findings made by a Trial Court, at the close of evidence, may be 
sufficient to support the Court's ruling. Hanson v Hanson, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 
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1987). In the present case, the Trial Court did make oral findings but there are not 
sufficient oral findings to support an issuance of a Protective Order. (T. 192-205) The 
Trial Court stated: 
"I'm troubled by the conflict here, and yet - so I want to explain my 
thinking why I'm doing what I'm doing. The Protective Order standard, I 
think, simply requires me to weigh what the people have said about 
whether there's abuse or domestic violence and whether there's a 
substantial likelihood that it might continue. And that in turn, it requires 
me to answer the question, was there some conduct that would give one a 
reasonable fear of imminent injury. And so in Utah, of course, the only 
thing that's been alleged is the events of December 12th, and in isolation 
that would, I believe, probably not qualify to get a Protective Order. I'm -
even though it's a swear word, I'm coming to get you. That can mean 
many things. But, of course, taken in history with other things, I do 
believe- and so what I'm dealing with is an Ex Parte Protective Order that 
was issued December 14th, and then it was extended on December 23rd, and 
then modified. But that portion of it has remained throughout, and I do 
believe, based upon the evidence I've heard, and the inferences I draw, and 
all of the testimony, that there has been sufficient evidence for me to 
conclude by a preponderance of the evidence - and it is very close that a 
Protective Order out to issue covering the basic aspects of protecting Ms. 
Choi."(T. 192.) 
No where in this oral finding does the Trial Court make a specific finding of any history 
of physical abuse. Further, the Trial Court specifically found that the event that occurred 
on the 12th of December, 2005, in isolation would "probably not qualify to get a 
Protective Order." (T. 192.) 
In the Bailey case {Supra, Footnote7), the Supreme Court stated, "In interpreting 
and applying section 30-6-2(1), the dissent concludes that "[u]nder the Cohabitant Abuse 
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Act and the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, a petitioner is granted a Protective Order 
when her or she is in fear of imminent physical harm." While this may be an accurate 
reading and interpretation of the second alternative ground for seeking a Protective Order 
under the statute, it ignores the plain language of the statute's first ground for seeking a 
Protective Order that provides that a petitioner may alternatively seek a Protective Order 
if he or she has been "subjected to abuse or domestic violence." Respondent respectfully 
submits that the Petitioner failed under both alternatives. There was no specific finding 
of any history of abuse and the Trial Court specifically found that the incident on the 12u 
of December, 2005, was not sufficient to substantiate that the Petitioner was in fear of 
imminent physical harm. The Trial Court stated that even based upon all of the evidence 
that the Trial Court had heard that its decision to issue the Protective Order was "very 
close." (T. 192.) If the Trial Court's decision was very close whether to issue or not issue 
the Protective Order, there should have been specific findings to support the Trial Court's 
decision. 
II. Did the Trial Court Err in Denying the Motion for a New Trial? 
A. Since the Trial Court did make an oral finding that the incident of 
December 12, 2005, did not qualify to create a dear of imminent physical 
harm; therefore, the Protective Order should not have been issued. The 
Petitioner's false accusations of previous abuse was not a specific finding of 
the Trial Court, and therefore, Petitioner failed as to a history of abuse as 
well. Based on the findings, the Protective Order should not have been 
issued. 
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The Respondent filed his Motion for a New Trial or to Amend Findings and Order 
on the 16th of February, 2006, along with a Memorandum in Support Thereof. (R. 139.) 
The Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading prior to the Court denying said 
Motion on the 20th of February, 2007. Respondent respectfully submits that the Trial 
Court erred in denying the Motion for a new trial. 
As stated by the Respondent in his Memorandum in Support of his Motion for a 
New Trial, the Court found, "That the allegations pertaining to the Petitioner's statement 
that the minor child was being abused by the Respondent during the time period from the 
23ld of December, 2005 through February 8, 2006, were not true and that there were no 
incidents relating to any acts by the Respondent that would justify any Protective Order 
in regard to the same. The Court further found that the allegations relating to the incident 
at the daycare that occurred on the 12th of December, 2005, which was the basis for 
issuing the initial Ex Parte Protective Order did not rise to the level required by statute in 
and of itself to justify an issuance of a Protective Order." (R. 139-140.). The Petitioner 
had only resided in the state of Utah for approximately one month prior to the Ex Parte 
Protective Order being issued in December of 2005. Montana was the home state of the 
minor child and as stated above, the Court found that there were no incidents that 
occurred in the state of Utah to justify the issuance of the Protective Order, and further 
that there was no basis for any issuance for a Protective Order on behalf of the minor 
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child. Respondent respectfully submits that the Trail Court lost jurisdiction to enter any 
Protective Order as related to the custody of the minor child, parenting time, and related 
issues. Although Utah Code 30-6-4.2(2)(f) allows the Court to grant temporary custody 
of the minor children of the parties under subparagraph 3(b) specify arrangements of 
parent time of a minor child said rights of the Court are subject to and preceded by the 
rights of the Courts of Montana, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Enforcement Act, which has been incorporated both by the State of Montana and the 
State of Utah. Therefore, since the State of Montana is still the home state of the minor 
child, and also the state wherein the divorce action has been filed, and the state wherein 
the Petitioner had admitted jurisdiction for said divorce action, the above Court is 
precluded from issuing any Protective Order in regard to the custody of the minor child 
and parenting time and the Protective Order granted by the Court should have only 
addressed the issue of protection of the Petitioner. (T. 140-141.) 
B. The Ex Parte Protective Order issued by the State of Utah on 
December 14, 2005, became ineffective upon the issuance of an Order by the 
State of Montana and subsequently relinquished any jurisdiction the State of 
Utah may have had. 
On or around December 14, 2007, the Trial Court issued an Ex Parte Protective 
Order, which included a child custody determination regarding the minor child in this 
matter. The Trial Court premised the child custody determination on Utah Code §78-
45c-204(l) which granted him emergency jurisdictional authority to enter the Ex Parte 
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Protective Order regarding the minor child. Specifically, Utah Code §78-45c-204(l) 
states: 
A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is 
present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in 
an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of 
the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. 
However, Utah Code §78-45c-204(2) specifically states that, "a child custody 
determination made under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained from a 
court of a state having jurisdiction . . . .v (emphasis added). The circumstance in this 
case mimics what is prescribed in Utah Code §78-45c-204. On or around December 15, 
2007, Petitioner filed a divorce action in Montana and the court in Montana issued an 
Order and Warrant for the return of the minor child to the custody of Peter lacavazzi. (R. 
24-31.) The Respondent was served with the Ex Parte Protective Order on the \lu of 
December 2005. (R. 21.) The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Ex Parte 
Protective Order on the 19th of December, 2005 and the hearing was held on the 23ra of 
December, 2005 and the Court entered a Ruling and Order. (R. 63.) At the December 
23rd hearing, the Trial Court found that it could exercise emergency jurisdiction and 
award custody and parent time even though the Court found that Montana was the home 
state of the minor child and the child had only been in Utah less than thirty days prior 
thereto. The Trial Court had a discussion with the Court in Montana and both judges 
believed that the Montana Court, as the home state of the minor child, would have 
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jurisdiction to determine whether it should exercise continuing jurisdiction. The Montana 
Court has continued to exercise jurisdiction and has never declined jurisdiction on any 
basis. Further, the Trial Court found that Montana has exclusive continuing jurisdiction 
over the minor child under U.C.C.J.E.A. until the Montana Court declined jurisdiction 
which it did not and has not. Further, the Montana Court never found that it was 
inconvenient forum. Most importantly the Trial Court in its ruling on the 23 of 
December, 2005, exercised emergency jurisdiction as to the child under Utah Code 78-
45c-204. The Court specifically stated in said ruling, tcThe Verified Petition establishes 
Petitioner's residence in Utah and alleges an act in Utah that, is prudent, would justify a 
Protective Order. The Court also indicated that under the facts of this case, the Court 
could maintain the temporary custody of the child with the Petitioner/' (R. 64.) 
However, as stated above, the Court found after the hearing on 8th of February, 2006 that 
the alleged act that occurred in Utah was not sufficient to justify an issuance of a 
permanent Protective Order. Moreover, the Court specifically found that the allegations 
in regard to the minor child were not true and that there was no danger to the minor child, 
and therefore refused to enter any Protective Order on behalf of the minor child. 
The case at hand clearly mimics Utah Code §78-45c-204. A Court within the 
home state of the minor child issued an order regarding custody, thus, any order 
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previously issued by a court in the State of Utah regarding custody becomes ineffective 
and preempted. 
In light of the foregoing, the State of Utah could not issue any initial child custody 
determination under Utah Code 78-45c-201. Disregarding Utah Code §78-45c-204, a 
court in the State of Utah only has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination if 
the State of Utah is the home state of the minor child or was the home state of the minor 
child within six months before the commencement of an action. Utah Code 78-45c-
201(l)(a). Clearly, this is not the case. The minor child resided in Montana with the 
parties prior to November 2005. Furthermore, the minor child never resided in the State 
of Utah for a six-month consecutive period prior to the action commenced by the 
Petitioner, Kristin Choi. Regardless of the whereabouts of the minor child at that time, 
the State of Utah could not have issued any child custody determination because the State 
of Montana had jurisdiction, by being the home state of the minor child, and did not 
decline jurisdiction as prescribed by Utah Code 78-45c-201(l)(b). 
Furthermore, and in conclusion, on or around June 5, 2006, the Third District 
Court in the State of Utah issued an Order Dismissing Civil Portion of Protective Order. 
Therefore, there was no longer any determination of custody and this illustrates the fact 
that the Third District Court in the State of Utah incorrectly issued the custody portions 
of the Ex Parte Protective Order granted on or around December 14, 2007. The Utah 
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Code specifically enumerates that a custody determination will become ineffective when 
a court with proper jurisdiction enters an order as to the same. Thus, because the State of 
Montana was, at that time, the home state of minor child and no court in the State of 
Montana declined jurisdiction, the State of Utah never had the jurisdictional authority to 
continue the effectiveness of the custody portions of the Ex Parte Protective Order issued 
on or around December 14, 2007. 
The above was argued in Respondent's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
a New Trial or to Amend the Findings and Order (R. 139); however, the Trial Court 
failed to give any reasons as to why it denied the Motion for a New Trial, but only 
indicated that there was no basis. (R.214.) Again, Respondent respectfully submits that 
the provisions in the Protective Order relating to custody, parenting time, and the minor 
child should have been vacated once the Trial Court found that there was no basis to issue 
a Protective Order on any act the occurred in the State of Utah. 
Rule 59(a)(7) allow the Court to grant a Motion for a New Trial or to Amend the 
Findings and Order if there has been an error in law. As stated above, Respondent 
respectfully submits that the Trial Court erred in two ways. First and foremost, it should 
not have entered a Protective Order in regard to the custody and parenting time of the 
minor child as previously argued, and second, the permanent Protective Order should not 
have been awarded based upon allegations of what may have occurred in the State of 
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Montana when the Trial Court found that there were no acts in the State of Utah to justify 
the issuance of the Protective Order. In Strollo v Strollo, 828 P.2d 532 (Utah App. 1992), 
in reviewing a previous statute in regard to cohabitant abuse, this Court stated, 'The 
statute clearly protects those who are reasonably in fear of physical harm resulting from 
past conduct coupled with present threat of future harm." Id 535. However in the Bailey 
case (Supra p. 1165), this Court seemed to indicate that a party may seek a Protective 
Order based only upon whether or not that party has been subjected to abuse or domestic 
violence and need not show that the party is in fear of imminent physical harm. 
However, in the present case there was no finding that the Petitioner had been subjected 
to abuse or domestic violence, and moreover, the Trial Court found that there was no fear 
of imminent physical harm. Based upon the same, the Court erred in granting the 
Protective Order, and should have granted a New Trial. 
III. Did the Trial Court Err in Refusing to Set Aside Certain Provisions of the 
Protective Order? 
On approximately 26th of April, 2006, the Respondent filed a Verified Motion to 
Vacate the Protective Order or in the alternative to Modify the same. (R. 153-169.) 
Specifically, the Respondent requested that the Protective Order issued on the 8n of 
February, 2006 be dismissed upon the basis of the Petitioner's constant and total 
disregard for the terms of the Protective Order. As stated in said Verified Motion to 
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Vacate, there were numerous incidents where the Petitioner and her mother, Dinah 
Kennedy, contacted the Respondent, went to Respondent's home in Bozeman, Montana, 
and continued to harass the Respondent. All of which indicated that there was no longer 
any threat of imminent harm. 
It appears extremely prejudicial to allow a Protective Order to remain in effect 
based upon the Petitioner's allegation of fear and imminent harm when, in fact, the 
Petitioner obviously was not in fear of any imminent harm for the reason that she 
continued to contact the Respondent and even went to Respondent's home when he was 
there. It seems unjustified to restrain one party through a Protective Order while 
allowing the other party to do whatever they please in regard to contacting or harassing, 
either directly or indirectly. Based upon the acts of the Petitioner after the Protective 
Order was issued, the Court should have considered the same and vacated the Protective 
Order since there was no longer any basis to maintain the same. 
Respondent has always contended that the only reason that the Petitioner filed for 
the Protective Order was to obtain an advantage in regard for her fight for custody of the 
minor child, Tanner. Her plan worked since the Protective Order was issued and 
temporary custody of the minor child was granted to the Petitioner, although it was 
modified to give both parties custody and to allow a 50-50 parenting time arrangement. 
The custody issue is still pending in the state of Montana, and a trial has not been 
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scheduled due to the delay in obtaining a custody evaluation. 
In any event, all of the above information was presented to the Court at the time of 
the Verified Motion to Vacate the Protective Order, but the Court still denied the same 
claiming that the statute, Utah Code 30-6-4.2(10) does not allow the Court to modify the 
criminal portions of a Protective Order unless there is consent of the other party. Consent 
of the Petitioner should have been implied based upon her acts as stated in the Verified 
Motion even though at the hearing held on the 21st of February, 2007, before the 
Commissioner, the Petitioner refused to give her consent. The evidence presented to the 
Court in Respondent's Verified Motion established that through the Petitioner's acts, she 
had in fact consented to vacating the Protective Order and she was no longer in fear; 
therefore, the Protective Order should be vacated. Coleman Production Credit 
Association v. Mahan, 168 S.W. 2d 903, 904 (Tex.Civ.App. 1943) states that, "Implied 
consent is that which is manifested by signs, actions or facts, or by inaction or silence 
from which consent to do a thing otherwise prohibited might be implied." Additionally, 
"Consent inferred from one's conduct rather than from one's direct expression." Black's 
Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004). 
Although the Trial Court did vacate the civil portions of the Protective Order, as 
stated in the Order dismissing the same (R. 195-196), the two paragraphs of the criminal 
portion in regard to the Subaru vehicle and the firearms were not dismissed at the 
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February 21, 2007 hearing, again based upon the Courts interpretation of the statutory 
provisions of Utah Code 30-6-4.2(10). 
However, the Protective Order issued by the Court (R. 130, 136) on page 3 has the 
following language, "This award is subject to Orders concerning the listed property in 
future civil proceedings." It is apparent that this language refers to the award of the 
Subaru Outback as stated in paragraph 7 of the Protective Order. This language of the 
Protective Order seems inconsistent with the language of Utah Code 30-6-4.2(10). Taken 
literally, a divorce court could modify the award of the Subaru vehicle, and thus modify 
the Protective Order without the consent of the Petitioner. However, the Trial Court that 
has jurisdiction over the Protective Order, apparently, would not have the same authority. 
Therefore, Respondent respectfully submits that the legislative intent in drafting Utah 
Code 30-6-4.2(10) was to allow a two year period of protection for the Petitioner and not 
prevent a modification as to award of personal property. The protection for the Petitioner 
should not include an award of personal property for a period of two years without any 
modification. Respondent respectfully submits that the Court in a Protective Order action 
should not be involved in determining who is awarded an automobile for a two year 
period, and the award of personal property should be under the jurisdiction of the divorce 
court and something that should be capable of being modified by the Court granting the 
Protective Order. 
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IV. Did the Trial Court Err in Using the Wrong Standard of Proof in the 
Hearing Held February 8, 2006? 
The Respondent respectfully submits that the standard of proof that a Trial 
Court should use at an Evidentiary Hearing in regard to the issuance of a Protective Order 
should be one of clear and convincing evidence. The Trial Court stated in its oral ruling, 
"But that portion of it has remained throughout and I do believe based upon the evidence 
I've heard and the inferences I draw and all the testimony that there has been sufficient 
evidence for me to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that- and it is very close 
that a Protective Order ought to issue covering the basic aspects of protecting Ms. Choi." 
(T. 192.) 
In Egbert v Nissan North America, Inc., 207 UT 64, 167 P.3d 1058, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated the following, 
"As to standards of proof generally, the United States Supreme Court 
has sad as follows: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept 
is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, 
is to ''instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our 
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions 
for a particular type of adjudication." The standard serves to allocate 
the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative 
importance attached to the ultimate decision. Thus, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is the standard appropriate for criminal defendants 
who stand to lose liberty or life upon conviction, while a preponderance 
of the evidence is the level of proof required in the typical civil case 
where only money damages are at stake. The intermediate standard of 
proof- clear and convincing evidence - is appropriate when the 
interests at stake in a civil case are "particularly important" and "more 
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substantial than the mere loss of money." For example, the United 
States Supreme Court has applied this standard in cases involving civil 
commitment, deportation, and denaturalization. We applied this 
standard in Uzelac v. Thurgood (In Re Estate ofS.T.T.), 206 UT 46, 144 
P.3d 1083, where we considered the appropriate standard of proof for 
rebutting the "presumption that parents act in the best interests of their 
children" in Utah's Grand-parent Visitation Statute. We held "that a 
clear and convincing standard of proof should apply to satisfy due 
process requirements" and explained that this was the case "[bjecause 
the parental presumption deals with parental liberty interests, and 
accordingly should be afforded great deference by the courts." Id. at 
1061-1062. 
Although the present case does not deal with grandparents rights or parental 
liberty interests, it does deal with constitutional rights and criminal penalties. The 
Protective Order issued against the Respondent states on page 4, "That any violation of 
the provisions 1-7 is a Class A Misdeameanor." (T.133.) Paragraph 1-7 of the Protective 
Order not only include the protection of the Petitioner, but also the prohibition of having 
any weapon and the loss of the 2000 Subaru Outback. The Respondent's right to a 
possession to a firearm is a constitutional right as well as his right to have his Subaru 
Outback. The Protective Order allows the Petitioner to keep the 2000 Subaru Outback 
for a period of two years even though it is not her vehicle, and she has failed to make any 
payments thereon. Further, the Respondent's employment is affected by the prohibition 
of carrying a firearm. (R. 153-169.) The biggest threat, however, is the potential of 
criminal sanctions if the Respondent were to violate the Protective Order. The standard 
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of proof of clear and convincing evidence has also been used in cases involving civil 
commitment and parental rights, and Respondent respectfully submits that his rights are 
also, "Particularly important" and "more substantial than the mere loss of money." 
Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 424 FN 8 
The granting of a Protective Order, as in this case, affects the Respondent's 
parental rights. The initial Ex Parte Protective Order issued by the Court on the 14th of 
December, 2005 (T. 15), granted temporary custody of Tanner lacavazzi to the Petitioner 
and denied the Respondent of any visitation until the hearing. Then in the Permanent 
Protective Order issued on the 8th of February, 2006 (T. 130), the Court granted to the 
Petitioner the custody of the minor child, Tanner lacavazzi, even though the minor child 
had only resided in Utah prior to the Ex Parte Protective Order being issued, and the 
Court had already determined that Montana was the home state of the minor child. The 
standard of proof for terminating parental rights is a clear and convincing standard of 
proof (Utah Code 78-3a-408(3)). The Ex Parte Protective Order terminates parental 
rights, although only for a few weeks, but nevertheless takes something away from the 
Respondent. Then the Permanent Protective Order, although not terminating the 
Respondent's rights, does affected his parental rights. Again, the Respondent 
respectfully submits that the interest in a Protective Order action are, "particularly 
important and more substantial than the mere loss of money," and the standard of proof 
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for Petitioner should be clear and convincing. 
CONCLUSION 
The issuance of the Permanent Protective Order should not have been issued 
and the Motion for a New Trial or to Amend the Findings should have been granted by 
the Trial Court for the following reasons: 
1. There were no findings of a history of abuse or domestic violence and 
there was no threat of imminent harm 
2. The incorrect standard of proof was used by the Court. 
The Court did not have jurisdiction to enter the civil portions of the protective 
order in regard to custody and parenting time. 
The Verified Motion to Vacate the Protective Order should have been granted 
for the reason that the Petitioner consented through her actions justifying vacating the 
Protective Order. 
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's granting of the Permanent 
Protective Order and its denial of the Motion for a New Trial and to Vacate the Protective 
Order. 
33 
DATED this day of December, 2007. 
Richard S. Nemelka 
Attorney for the Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT this ^"7 day of December, 2007, postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
ASA E KELLEY 
KELLEY & KELLEY LLC 
859 E. 900 S. STE201 
SLC, UT 84105 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
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KristinCboi-Iacavazzi BOZEMAN MUN!CIPAL76^ R/Rf 
515 Michael Grove #53 
Bozeman, MT 59718 ZOOS JUL 2 7 Pfl 5 ^ 
406-522-0855 
FILED 
BY 
Susan Wordal CLERK 
Assistant City Attorney 
PO Box 1230 
Bozeman, MT 59718-1230 
Dear Susan, 
My name is Kristin Choi-lacavazzi I ara writing to you regarding case # TK-2005-03234. 
This case involves my husband Peter Iacavazzi Back in June my husband and I had an 
argument that resulted in my calling the Bozeman P.D Subsequently my husband was 
crested and charged with Partner Family Marital Assault Please let me reiterate with 
you as I did with the responding officers. My husband Peter Iacavazzi did not touch mc 
He in no way threatened me with physical violence and again he did not put h*s hands 
Upon me. 
However he was charged with Partner Family Marital Assault He was detained for 
twenty four hours and released without posting bond. But the Honorable Judge Karl Seel 
did impose bail c o i t i o n s that prohibited my husband from any contact with myself and 
"our* son Tanner. 
I am requesting that this bail condition please be lifted. My husband and I would like the 
opportunity to begin reconciliation of out marriage I think it is very important for my 
husband to continue having contact with our son as well I realize that this unfortunate 
event has caused our family a great deal of stress and my only concern now is to help our 
family begin the healing and growing process. 
Thank you for; your prompt attention to this request 
Sincerely, 
kin Choi-Iacayazzi 
Cc Hon, %ftl Seel 
Bozeman Municipal Coiirt 
615 S. jtf* 
Law and Justice Center 
Bowman, Mtf597l* 
